This creates uncertainties, distractions and perverse incentives all around:

0. Everything is dramatically complicated by the artificial divisions of work across states needed to get enough political support. Grossly inefficient from the start, and inflexible into perpetuity.

1. Initial schedules are incentivized to be unrealistic, and not reflective of hard analysis/planning, in order to get funding. Easier to deal with the real details and expand schedules later, even though nobody wants that to be the process.

2. Essentially a cost plus (or cost even) program. There is no hard limit on cost, since the further along a project is, the easier it is to raise its budget, especially along with schedule delays.

3. Creativity flows to the most basic constraint. The most basic constraint is political will to fund, so top level attention goes to managing/manipulating up.

When NASA's hard constraint was time (getting to the moon first), creativity went there. They were never cheap, but they did operate with incredible speed.

Whereas any private company's basic constraints are relative profitability in terms of net return in a given time frame, so creativity goes to both speed and cost.

4. Boeing and other traditional large NASA contractors operated for decades under NASA's politically driven, cost plus umbrella, so continue to suffer from, and reinforce, NASA's problems.

This culture is hard to break, even after switching to a flat cost (still time flexible) regime. See recent Boeing troubles. Not just throw away rockets, but a much delayed, over budget, wonky one-way manned spaceship!! Ouch!

NASA is first and foremost about prestige (even above science IMO. This is also - again my opinion - why NASA hasn't been back to the moon in 50 years. There's little prestige to be gained for an expensive operation). With prestige as the backdrop, it makes them very risk adverse. There are layers and layers of requirements made to reduce risk. To their credit, SpaceX is willing to fail more than NASA and it allows them to iterate much faster.

This is also my opinion part of the reasons why NASA wanted the CCP to begin with: it allows them to skirt many of the requirements. The somewhat ironic part is that NASA pathways to alleviate those requirements, but it's somewhat common that project/programs want to go through the waiver process and formerly accept that risk.

There is a fairly well-known dynamic in govt contracting where a contractor low-bids to get the contract and then makes money on change-orders. If they were to accurately bid on all the NASA requirements, they risk their bid being so high they would never be awarded the contract. This is a similar dynamic to the traditional cost-plus contracting paradigm.

There is also some irony in that SpaceX may be the victims of the same dynamic. As failure occur, they may layer on more requirements that ultimately slow the process down (see the supplier quality issues related to an F9 strut failure). Given enough time, there is a risk that added requirements turn them into the dinosaurs they are replacing.

Also, as others have brought up, NASA has additional requirements they must manage (e.g., political risk) that SpaceX has less exposure to.

Major beneficiaries are the states of Florida, Mississippi, and Alabama (Huntsville) but there are beneficiaries all over the place. Classical DoD/NASA contractors know to locate facilities all over the country to maximize political capital via connection to local jobs in many jurisdictions.

Some of it is reasonable. Covid threw a spanner in schedules and increased costs due to a rise in price levels. Some is from design changes due to new information, e.g. "during launch, the SLS generates exhaust blast plume pressure, random vibration, vibration from acoustics, and heat. These loads can cause damage to the launch vehicle, payload, launch pad, and surrounding structures. After the Artemis I launch, NASA found higher-than-expected thermal, acoustic, and blast loads to the ML-1. ML-2 project management is assessing these lessons learned from Artemis I and anticipates the ML-2 structure will require some additional strengthening to withstand the predicted loads" [1].

A lot of it, however, is laughably-incompetent cost-plus subcontracting nonsense: "While Bechtel revised its IFCs in response to the RFIs, according to ML-2 project management, the company did not allot sufficient time in its schedule to do so, and this iterative process resulted in cost increases and schedule delays. In mid-2023, ML-2 project management found the delays in steel fabrication and delivery resulted in a 3-month schedule slip, leaving Bechtel with no additional schedule reserve to meet the May 2026 contract end date.

...

In mid-2021, ML-2 project management noted that Bechtel’s 'interactions and business relationship with the steel fabricator deteriorated to the point of dysfunction,' resulting in unresolved fabrication issues that impacted the ML-2 project’s critical path. Bechtel’s lack of awareness and oversight of critical second-tier subcontractors responsible for steel fabrication contributed to a delayed construction start date. One subcontractor, which Bechtel allocated approximately 46 percent of the fabrication work to, sold all of its shop space to a non-NASA customer because Bechtel's steel fabrication plan lacked a signed contract with the subcontractor. As a result, Bechtel attempted to find another subcontractor with available shop space but was unable to do so in a timely manner. The delay in the steel fabrication process continued to impact the ML-2 project’s schedule" (pp 18).

[1] https://oig.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/ig-24-016.pd...page 20

fun fact...its part of the legal boilerplate astronauts sign...

> NASA intends to keep Bechtel accountable to the cost and schedule agreed to in December 2023.

It's mind boggling how they heck is Bechtel qualified to handle this project? Bechtel is at the center of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cochabamba_Water_War / https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/bechtel-battles-against-.... Talk about an agency that supposedly cares to look progressive and caring for the environment. Then they pick Bechtel as their contractor for the SLS.

> We also found that Bechtel’s performance drove the significant cost increases and schedule delays to the design and development of the ML-2. The current contract value of $1.1 billion includes $594 million of Bechtel overruns

Shouldn't somebody there fire Bechtel. I guess that significantly reduces your chance of retiring at Bechtel after leaving your NASA job...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EY8nbSwjtEY

https://www.stokespace.com

You've truly achieved wealth when even people you don't like and don't like you in return depend on your shit to stay alive!

A moon rocket for 2.7B would be a steal. This is just for a mostly static steel tower (on a mobile carrier?) that holds the rocket up and provides some piping etc to the rocket before launch.

The mobile carrier is not included in the price AFAIK, but not sure.