The whole reason we even have time to think this way is because we are at the peak of an industrial civilization that has created a level of abundance that allows a lot of people a lot of time to think. But the whole situation that we live in is not stable at all, "progress" could continue, or we could hit a peak and regress. As much as we can see a lot of long-term trajectories (eg. peak oil, global warming), we really have no idea what will be the triggers and inflection points that change the social fabric in ways that are unforeseeable and quickly invalidate whatever prior assumptions all that deep thinking was resting upon. I mean 50 years ago we thought overpopulation was the biggest risk, and that thinking has completely flipped even without a major trajectory change for industrial civilization in that time.

Incidentally, the flaw in this theory is in thinking you understand what all the existential risks are.

Suppose you clock "malicious AI" as a huge risk and then hamper AI, but it turns out the bigger risk is not doing space exploration, which AI would have accelerated, because something catastrophic yet already-inevitable is going to happen to the Earth in a few hundred years and if we're not sustainably multi-planetary by then it's all over.

The thing evolution teaches us is that diversity is a group survival trait. Anybody insisting "nobody anywhere should do X" is more likely to cause an ELE than prevent one.

You don't have to agree with any of this. I am not defending every idea the author has. But I recommend that book.

This is the logic of someone who has failed to comprehend the core ideas of Calculus 101. You cannot use intuitive reasoning when it comes to infinite sums of numbers with extremely large uncertainties. All that results is making a fool out of yourself.

I get the feeling these people often want to seem smarter than they are, regardless of how smart they are. And they want to get money to ostensibly "consider these issues", but really they want money for nothing.

If they wanted to do right by the future masses, they should be looking to the things that are affecting us right now. But they treat those issues as if they'll work out in the wash.

I quickly lost interest in Roko's Basilisk, but that is what brought me in the door and started me looking around the discussions. At first, it was quite seductive. There was a strange fearlessness there, a willingness to say and admit some things about humanity, our limitations and how we tend to think that other great thinkers maybe danced around in the past. After awhile it became clear that while there were a select few individuals who had found some balance between purely rational thinking and how reality actually works, most of the rest had their heads so far up their asses that they'd fart and call it a cool breeze. Reminded me of my brief obsession with Game Theory and realizing that even it's creators knew it's utility was not quite as advertised to the layman (as in it would not really help you predict or plan for anything at all, just model how decisions might be made).

IMO it's fine to pick a favorite and devote extra resources to it. But that turns less fine when one also starts working to deprive everything else of any oxygen because it's not your favorite. (And I'm aware that this criticism applies to lots of communities.)

If you assume we eventually figure out long distance space travel and humanity spreads across the galaxy, there could in the future be quadrillions of people, growing at some kind of exponential rate. So accelerating the space race by even an hour is equivalent to bringing billions of new souls into existence.

(1) The kind of Gatesian solutions they like to fund like mosquito nets are part of the problem, not part of the solution as I see it. If things are going to get better in Africa, it will be because Africans grow their economy and pay taxes and their governments can provide the services that they want. Expecting NGOs to do everything for them is the same kind of neoliberal thinking that has rotted state capacity in the core and set us up for a political crisis.

(2) It is one thing to do something wrong, realize it was a mistake, and then make amends. It's another thing to do plan to do something wrong and to try to offset it somehow. Many of the high paying jobs that EA wants young people to enter are "part of the problem" when it comes to declining stage capacity, legitimation crisis, and not dealing with immediate problems -- like the fact that one of these days there's going to be a heat wave that is a mass causality event.

Furthermore

(3) Time discounting is a central part of economic planning

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_discount_rate

It is controversial as hell, but one of the many things the Soviet Union got wrong before the 1980s was planning with a discount rate of zero, which led to many economically and ecologically harmful projects. If you seriously think it should be zero you should also be considering whether anybody should work in the finance industry at all or if we should have dropped a hydrogen bomb on Exxon's headquarters yesterday. At some point speculations about the future are just speculation. When it comes to the nuclear waste issue, for instance, I don't think we have any idea what state people are going to be in 20,000 years. They might be really pissed that buried spent nuclear fuel some place they can't get at it. Even the plan to burn plutonium completely in fast breeder reactors has an air of unreality about it, even though it happens on a relatively short 1000 year timescale we can't be sure at all that anyone will be around to finish the job.

(4) If you are looking for low-probability events to worry about I think you could find a lot of them. If it was really a movement of free thinkers they'd be concerned about 4,000 horsemen of the apocalypse, not the 4 or so that they are allowed to talk about -- but talk about a bunch of people who'll cancel you if you "think different". Somehow climate change and legitimation crisis just get... ignored.

(5) Although it is run by people who say they are militant atheists, the movement has all the trappings of a religion, not least "The Singularity" was talked about by Jesuit Priest Teilhard de Chardin long before sci-fi writer Vernor Vinge used it as the hinge of a mystery novel.

They don't even do this.

If you're reasoning in purely logical and deductive way - it's blatantly obvious that living beings experience way more pain and suffering, than pleasure and joy. If you do the math, humanity getting wiped out in effect is the best thing that could happen.

Which is why accelerationism ignoring all the AGI risks is correct strategy presuming the AGI will either wipe us out (good outcome) or provide technologies that improve the human condition and reduce suffering (good outcome).

Logical and deductive reasoning based on completely baseless and obviously incorrect premises is flat out idiotic.

You can't deprive non-existent people out of anything.

And if you do, I hope you're ready for purely logical, deductive follow up - every droplet of sperm is sacred and should be used to impregnate.

Being able to do that is pretty much "entry level cognition" for a lot of us. You should be doing that yourself and doing it all the time if you want to play with the big kids.

One of the things I really miss about the old nerds-only programmer's pit setup was the amount of room we had for instruction, especially regarding social issues. The scenes from the college department in Wargames were really on the nose, but highlight a form of education that was unavoidable if you couldn't just dip out of a conversation.

Humans are generally better at perceiving threats than they are at putting those threats into words. When something seems "dangerous" abstractly, they will come up with words for why---but those words don't necessarily reflect the actual threat, because the threat might be hard to describe. Nevertheless the valence of their response reflects their actual emotion on the subject.

In this case: the rationalist philosophy basically creeps people out. There is something "insidious" about it. And this is not a delusion on the part of the people judging them: it really does threaten them, and likely for good reason. The explanation is something like "we extrapolate from the way that rationalists think and realize that their philosophy leads to dangerous conclusions." Some of these conclusions have already been made by the rationalists---like valuing people far away abstractly over people next door, by trying to quantify suffering and altruism like a math problem (or to place moral weight on animals over humans, or people in the future over people today). Other conclusions are just implied, waiting to be made later. But the human mind detects them anyway as implications of the way of thinking, and reacts accordingly: thinking like this is dangerous and should be argued against.

This extrapolation is hard to put into words, so everyone who tries to express their discomfort misses the target somewhat, and then, if you are the sort of person who only takes things literally, it sounds like they are all just attacking someone out of judgment or bitterness or something instead of for real reasons. But I can't emphasize this enough: their emotions are real, they're just failing to put them into words effectively. It's a skill issue. You will understand what's happening better if you understand that this is what's going on and then try to take their emotions seriously even if they are not communicating them very well.

So that's what's going on here. But I think I can also do a decent job of describing the actual problem that people have with the rationalist mindset. It's something like this:

Humans have an innate moral intuition that "personal" morality, the kind that takes care of themselves and their family and friends and community, is supposed to be sacrosanct: people are supposed to both practice it and protect the necessity of practicing it. We simply can't trust the world to be a safe place if people don't think of looking out for the people around them as a fundamental moral duty. And once those people are safe, protecting more people, such as a tribe or a nation or all of humanity or all of the planet, becomes permissible.

Sometimes people don't or can't practice this protection for various reasons, and that's morally fine, because it's a local problem that can be solved locally. But it's very insidious to turn around and justify not practicing it as a better way to live: "actually it's better not to behave morally; it's better to allocate resources to people far away; it's better to dedicate ourselves to fighting nebulous threats like AI safety or other X-risks instead of our neighbors; or, it's better to protect animals than people, because there are more of them". It's fine to work on important far-away problems once local problems are solved, if that's what you want. But it can't take priority, regardless of how the math works out. To work on global numbers-game problems instead of local problems, and to justify that with arguments, and to try to convince other people to also do that---that's dangerous as hell. It proves too much: it argues that humans at large ought to dismantle their personal moralities in favor of processing the world like a paperclip-maximizing robot. And that is exactly as dangerous as a paperclip-maximizing robot is. Just at a slower timescale.

(No surprise that this movement is popular among social outcasts, for whom local morality is going to feel less important, and (I suspect) autistic people, who probably experience less direct moral empathy for the people around them, as well as to the economically-insulated well-to-do tech-nerd types who are less likely to be directly exposed to suffering in their immediate communities.)

Ironically paperclip-maximizing-robots are exactly the thing that the rationalists are so worried about. They are a group of people who missed, and then disavowed, and now advocate disavowing, this "personal" morality, and unsurprisingly they view the world in a lens that doesn't include it, which means mostly being worried about problems of the same sort. But it provokes a strong negative reaction from everyone who thinks about the world in terms of that personal duty to safety, because that is the foundation of all morality, and is utterly essential to preserve, because it makes sure that whatever else you are doing doesn't go awry.

(edit: let me add that your aversion to the criticisms of rationalists is not unreasonable either. Given that you're parsing the criticisms as unreasonable, which they likely are (because of the skill issue), what you're seeing is a movement with value that seems to be being unfairly attacked. And you're right, the value is actually there! But the ultimate goal here is a synthesis: to get the value of the rationalist movement but to synthesize it with the recognition of the red flags that it sets off. Ignoring either side, the value or the critique, is ultimately counterproductive: the right goal is to synthesize both into a productive middle ground. (This is the arc of philosophy; it's what philosophy is. Not re-reading Plato.) The rationalists are probably morally correct in being motivated to highly-scaling actions e.g. the purview of "Effective Altruism". They are getting attacked for what they're discarding to do that, not for caring about it in the first place.)

The primary issues as others have noted is they focus on people going to the highest paying jobs without much care for morality of the jobs. Ergo they are fine being net negatives in terms of their work and philosophy.

All they do is donate money. Donations don’t fix society. Nothing changes structurally. No root problems are looked at.

They largely ignore capitalism’s faults or when I’ve seen them talk about, it’s done in a way of superficially decrying capitalist issues but then largely going along with them. Which ties into how they focus on high paying jobs regardless of morality (I’m exaggerating here but the overall point is correct).

—

HN is not intelligent when it comes to politics or the world. The avg person here is a western chauvinist with little political knowledge but a defensive ego about it. No need to be sad about this comment page.

The newsletter is of course far more to the point than that, but even then you'll notice half of it is devoted to understanding the emotional state and intentions of LLMs...

It is of course entirely possible to identify as an "Effective Altruist" whilst making above-average donations to charities with rigorous efficacy metrics and otherwise being completely normal, but that's not the centre of EA debate or culture....

In that case I don't think you've met any of the people under discussion.

“[...] Clevinger was one of those people with lots of intelligence and no brains, and everyone knew it except those who soon found it out. In short, he was a dope." - Joseph Heller, Catch-22 https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/7522733-in-short-clevinger-...

Maybe it's similar to the "Good Student" picture. Bright within a given assignment, but taking the assignment to be immutable, or taking no interest in where the assignment comes from.

Or I've heard a saying "nobody will pay you to solve problems that they've already defined clearly."

https://www.lesswrong.com/ and https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/ run on the same software, and some people have an account at both of them, but they are generally separate web communities.

If they want to donate to charity, they can just donate. You don't gotta make a religion out of it.

Ironically, that reminds me of "37 Ways That Words Can Be Wrong", written by Eliezer Yudkowsky in 2008...

I remember as a child coming to the same "if reality is a deception, at least I must exist to be deceived" conclusion that Descartes did, well before I had heard of Descartes. (I don't think this makes me special, it's just a natural conclusion anyone will reach if they ponder the subject). I think it's harmless for me to discuss that idea in public without someone saying "you need to read Descartes before you can talk about this".

I also find my personal ethics are stronly aligned with what Kant espoused. But most people I talk to are not academic philosophers and have not read Kant, so when I want to explain my morals, I am better off explaining the ideas themselves than talking about Kant, which would be a distraction anyway because I didn't learn them from Kant, we just arrived at the same conclusions. If I'm talking with a philosopher I can just say "I'm a Kantian" as shorthand, but that's really just jargon for people who already know what I'm talking about.

I also think that while it would be unusual for someone to (for example) write a guide to understanding relativity without once mentioning Einstein, it also wouldn't be a fundamental flaw.

(But I agree there's no certainly excuse for someone asserting that they're right because they're rational!)

This is a feature, not a bug, for writers who hold an opinion on something and want to rationalize it.

So many of the rationalist posts I've read through the years come from someone who has an opinion or gut feeling about something, but they want it to be seen as something more rigorous. The "first principles" writing style is a license to throw out the existing research on the topic, including contradictory evidence, and construct an all new scaffold around their opinion that makes it look more valid.

I use the "SlimeTimeMoldTime - A Chemical Hunger" blog series as an example because it was so widely shared and endorsed in the rationalist community: https://slimemoldtimemold.com/2021/07/07/a-chemical-hunger-p... It even received a financial grant from Scott Alexander of Astral Codex Ten

Actual experts were discrediting the series from the first blog post and explaining all of the author's errors, but the community soldiered on with it anyway, eventually making the belief that lithium in the water supply was causing the obesity epidemic into a meme within the rationalist community. There's no evidence supporting this and countless take-downs of how the author misinterpreted or cherry-picked data, but because it was written with the rationalist style and given the implicit blessing of a rationalist figurehead it was adopted as ground truth by many for years. People have been waking up to issues with the series for a while now, but at the time it was remarkable how quickly the idea spread as if it was a true, novel discovery.

I find a lot of people in software have an insufferable tendency to simply ignore entire bodies of prior art, prior research, etc. outside of maybe computer science (and even that can be rare), and yet they act as though they are the most studied participants in the subject, proudly proclaiming their "genius insights" that are essentially restatements of basic facts in any given field that they would have learned if they just bothered to, you know, actually do research and put aside their egos for half a second to wonder if maybe the eons of human activity prior to their precious existence might have led to some decent knowledge.

If you want to say their humility is not genuine, fine. I'm not sure I agree with it, but you are entitled to that view. But to simultaneously be attacking the same community for not ever showing a sense of maybe being wrong or uncertain, and also for expressing it so often it's become an in-group signal, is just too much cognitive dissonance.

I think that sentence would be a fair description of certain individuals in the EA community, especially SBF, but that is not the same thing as saying that rationalists don't ever express epistemic uncertainty, when on average they spend more words on that than just about any other group I can think of.

Ah. I guess they are working out ecology through first principles, I guess?

I feel like a lot of the criticism of EA and rationalism does boil down to some kind of general criticism of naivete and entitlement, which... is probably true when applied to lots of people, regardless of whether they espouse these ideas or not.

It's also easier to criticize obviously doomed/misguided efforts at making the world a better place than to think deeply about how many of the pressing modern day problems (environmental issues, extinction, human suffering, etc.) also seem to be completely intractable, when analyzed in terms of the average individual's ability to take action. I think some criticism of EA or rationalism is also a reaction to a creeping unspoken consensus that "things are only going to get worse" in the future.

They bought one mansion to host fundraisers with the super-rich, which I believe is an important correction. You might disagree with that reasoning as well, but it's definitely not as described.

Yes! It can be true both that rationalists tend, more than almost any other group, to admit and try to take account of their uncertainty about things they say and that it's fun to dunk on them for being arrogant and always assuming they're 100% right!

Because they we doing so many workshops that buying a building was cheaper than renting all the time.

You may argue that organizing workshops is wrong (and you might be right about that), but once you choose to do them, it makes sense to choose the cheaper option rather than the more expensive one. That's not rationalist rhetoric, that's just basic economy.

Eliezer did once state his intentions to build "friendly AI", but seems to have been thwarted by his first order reasoning about how AI decision theory should work being more important to him than building something that actually did work, even when others figured out the latter bit.

I think that the OP's point was that it doesn't matter whether it's "real AI" or not. Even if it's just a glorified auto-correct system, it's one that has the clear potential to overturn our information/communication systems and our assumptions about individuals' economic value.

Instead, unless there's a single winner, we will probably see the knowledge on how to train big LLMs and make them perform well diffuse throughout a large pool of AI researchers, with the hardware to train models reasonably close to the SotA becoming more quite accessible.

I think the people who will benefit will be the owners of ordinary but hard-to-dislodge software firms, maybe those that have a hardware component. Maybe firms like Apple, maybe car manufacturers. Pure software firms might end up having AI assisted programmers as competitors instead, pushing margins down.

This is of course pretty speculative, and it's not reality yet, since firms like Cursor etc. have high valuations, but I think this is what you'd get from the probably pressure if it keeps getting better.

I originally came to this critique via Heidegger, who argues that enlightenment thinking essentially forgets / obscures Being itself, a specific mode of which you experience at this very moment as you read this comment, which is really the basis of everything that we know, including science, technology, and rationality. It seems important to recover and deepen this understanding if we are to have any hope of managing science and technology in a way that is actually beneficial to humans.

Reduce a computer's behavior to its hardware design, state of RAM, and physical laws. All those voltages make no sense until you come up with the idea of stored instructions, division of the bits into some kind of memory space, etc. You may say, you can predict the future of the RAM. And that's true. But if you can't read the messages the computer prints out, then you're still doing circuits, not software.

Is that reductionist approach providing valuable insight? YES! Is it the whole picture? No.

This warning isn't new, and it's very mainstream. https://www.tkm.kit.edu/downloads/TKM1_2011_more_is_differen...

What you are mentioning is called western reductionism by some.

In the western world it does map to Plato etc, but it is also a problem if you believe everything is reducible.

Under the assumption that all models are wrong, but some are useful, it helps you find useful models.

If you consider Laplacian determinism as a proxy for reductionism, Cantor diagonalization and the standard model of QM are counterexamples.

Russell's paradox is another lens into the limits of Plato, which the PEM assumption is based on.

Those common a priori assumptions have value, but are assumptions which may not hold for any particular problem.

I don't buy the marketing angle, because it doesn't actually make sense to me. Fear draws eyeballs, sure, but it just seems otherwise nakedly counterproductive, like a burger chain advertising itself on the brutality of its factory farms.

Take this all with more than a few grains of salt. I am by no means an expert in this territory. But I don't shy away from thinking about something just because I start out sounding like an idiot. Also take into account this is post-hoc, and 1940 Manhattan Project me would obviously have had much, much less information to work with about how things actually panned out. My answer to this question should be seen as separate to the question of whether I think dodging the Manhattan Project would have been a good bet, so to speak.

Most historians agree that Japan was going to lose one way or another by that point in the war. Truman argued that dropping the bomb killed fewer people in Japan than continuing, which I agree with, but that's a relatively small factor in the calculation.

The much bigger factor is that the success of the Manhattan Project as an ultimate existence proof for the possibility of such weaponry almost certainly galvanized the Soviet Union to get on the path of building it themselves much more aggressively. A Cold War where one side takes substantially longer to get to nukes is mostly an obvious x-risk win. Counterfactual worlds can never be seen with certainty, but it wouldn't surprise me if the mere existence proof led the USSR to actually create their own atomic weapons a decade faster than they would have otherwise, by e.g. motivating Stalin to actually care about what all those eggheads were up to (much to the terror of said eggheads).

This is a bad argument to advance when we're arguing about e.g. the invention of calculus, which as you'll recall was coinvented in at least 2 places (Newton with fluxions, Liebniz with infinitesimals I think), but calculus was the kind of thing that could be invented by one smart guy in his home office. It's a much more believable one when the only actors who could have made it were huge state-sponsored laboratories in the US and the USSR.

If you buy that, that's 5 to 10 extra years the US would have had in order to do something like the Manhattan Project, but in much more controlled, peace-time environments. The atmosphere-ignition prior would have been stamped out pretty quickly by later calculations of physicists to the contrary, and after that research would have gotten back to full steam ahead. I think the counterfactual US would have gotten onto the atom bomb in the early 1950s at the absolute latest with the talent they had in an MP-less world. Just with much greater safety protocols, and without the Russians learning of it in such blatant fashion. Our abilities to detect such weapons being developed elsewhere would likely have also stayed far ahead of the Russians. You could easily imagine a situation where the Russians finally create a weapon in 1960 that was almost as powerful as what we had cooked up by 1950.

Then you're more or less back to an old-fashioned deterrence model, with the twist that the Russians don't actually know exactly how powerful the weapons the US has developed are. This is an absolute good: You can always choose to reveal just a lower bound of how powerful your side is, if you think you need to, or you can choose to remain totally cloaked in darkness. If you buy the narrative that the US were "the good guys" (I do!) and wouldn't risk armaggedon just because they had the upper hand, then this seems like it can only make the future arc of the (already shorter) Cold War all the safer.

I am assuming Gorbachev or someone still called this whole circus off around the late 80s-early 90s. Gotta trim the butterfly effect somewhere.

For example, I won't cross the street without 99.99% confidence that I will survive. I cross streets so many times that a lower threshold like 99% would look like insanely risky dart-into-traffic behaviour.

If an asteroid is heading for earth, then even a 25% probability of apocalyptic collision is enough that I would call it very high, and spend almost all my focus attempting to prevent that outcome. But I wouldn't empty my retirement account for the sake of hedonism because there's still a 75% chance I make it through and need to plan my retirement.

Do you have specific examples in mind? (And not to put too fine a point on it, do you think there's a chance that you might be wrong about this assertion? You've expressed it very confidently...)

It has a priesthood that speaks for god (quantum). It has ideals passed down from on high. It has presuppositions about how the universe functions which must not be questioned. And it's filled with people happy that they are the chosen ones and they feel sorry for everyone that isn't enlightened like they are.

In the OPs article, I had to chuckle a little when they started the whole thing off by mentioning how other Rationalists recognized them as a physicist (they aren't). Then they proceeded to talk about "quantum cloning theory".

Therein is the problem. A bunch of people vociferously speaking outside their expertise confidently and being taken seriously by others.

I support anyone trying to form rational pictures of the universe and humanity. If the LessWrong community approach seems to make sense and is enriching to your understanding of the world then I am happy for you. But, every time I try to take a serious delve into LessWrong, and I have done it multiple times over the years, it sets off my cult/scam alerts.

https://www.lesswrong.com/w/epistemology

https://www.lesswrong.com/w/priors

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/2x67s6u8oAitNKF73/ (a post noting that the foundational problems in mech interp are grounded in philosophical questions about representation ~150 years old)

https://www.lesswrong.com/w/consciousness (the page on consciousness first citing the MIT and Stanford encyclopedias, then providing a timeline from Democritus, through Descartes, Hobbes,... all the way to Nagel, Chalmers, Tegmark).

There is also sort of a meme of interest in Thomas Kuhn: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/HcjL8ydHxPezj6wrt/book-revie...

See also these attempts to refer and collate prior literature: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/qc7P2NwfxQMC3hdgm/rationalis...

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/xg3hXCYQPJkwHyik2/the-best-t...

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/SXJGSPeQWbACveJhs/the-best-t...

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/HLJMyd4ncE3kvjwhe/the-best-r...

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/bMmD5qNFKRqKBJnKw/rigorous-p...

Now, one may disagree with the particular choices or philosophical positions taken, but it's pretty hard to say these people are ignorant or not trying to be informed about what prior thinkers have done, especially compared to any particular reference culture, except maybe academics.

As for the thing about Aella, I feel she's not as much of a thought leader as you've surmised, and I think doesn't claim to be. My personal view is that she does some interesting semi-rigorous surveying that is unlikely to be done elsewhere. She's not a scientist/statistician or a total revolutionary but her stuff is not devoid of informational value either. Some of her claims are hedged adequately, some of them are hedged a bit inadequately. You might have encountered some particularly (irrationally?) ardent fans.

The Catholic Church follows the Melchisedec order (Heb v. ; vi. ; vii). The term Catholic (καθολικη) was used as early as the first century; it is an adjective which describes Christianity.

The oldest record that we have to this day is the Epistle of Ignatius to the Smyrnaeans Chapter 8 where St. Ignatius writes "ωσπερ οπου αν η Χριστος Ιησους, εκει η καθολικη εκκλησια". (just as where Jesus Christ is, there is the Catholic Church.):

https://greekdoc.com/DOCUMENTS/early/i-smyrnaeans.html

The protestors in the 16th c. called themselves Protestants, so that's what everyone calls them. English heretic-schismatics didn't want to share the opprobrium so they called themselves English, hence Anglican. In USA they weren't governed congregationally like the Congregationalists, or by presbyters like the Presbyterians, but by bishops, so they called themselves Bishop-ruled, or Episcopalians. (In fact, Katharine Jefferts-Schori changed the name of the denomination from The Protestant Episcopal Church to The Episcopal Church recently.)

The orthodox catholics called themselves Orthodox to distance themselves from the unorthodox of which there were plenty, spawning themselves off in the wake of practically every ecumenical council.

Lutherans in the USA name themselves after Father Martin Luther, some Augustinian priest from Saxony who protested against the Church's hypocritical corruption at the time, and the controversy eventually got out of hand and precipitated a schism/heretical revolution, back in the 1500s, but Lutherans back in Germany and Scandinavia call themselves Gospel churches, hence Evangelical. Some USA denominations that go back to Germany and who came over to USA brought that name with them.

Pentecostals name themselves after the incident in Acts where the Holy Spirit set fire to the world (cf. Acts 2) on the occasion of the Jewish holiday of Shavuot, q.v., which in Greek was called Fiftieth Day After Passover, hence Pentecosti. What distinguishes Pentecostals is their emphasis on what they call "speaking in tongues", which in my opin...be charitable, kempff...which they see as a continuance of the Holy Spirit's work in the world and in the lives of believers.

Bayesianism requires you to assume / formalize your prior belief about the subject under investigation and updates it given some data, resulting in a posterior belief distribution. It thus does not have the clear distinctions of frequentism, but that can also be considered an advantage.

[1] https://web.mit.edu/hackl/www/lab/turkshop/readings/gigerenz...

Popperians claim that positive justification is impossible.

Popperians claim.Induction doesn't exist (or at least , matter in science)

Popper was prepared to consider the existence of Propensities objective.probabilities, whereas Bayesians, particularly those who follow Jaynes believe in determinism and subjective probability.

Popperian refutation is all or nothing, whereas Bayesian negative information is gradual.

In Popperism, there can be more than one front running or most favoured theory, even after the falsifiable ones have been falsified, since there aren't quantifiable degrees of confirmation.

For Popper and Deutsch, theories need to be explanatory, not just predictive. Bayesian confirmation and disconfirmation only target prediction directly -- if they are achieving explanation or ontological correspondence , that would be the result of a convenient coincidence.

For Popperians, the construction of good theoretical conjectures is as important as testing them. Bayesian seem quite uninterested in where hypotheses come from.

For Deutschians, being hard-to-vary is the preferred principle of parsimony. For Yudkuwsians, it's computation complexity.

Error correction as something you actually do. Popperians like to put forward hypotheses that are easy to refute. Bayesians approve theoretically of "updating", but dislike objections and criticisms in practice.

(Long term) prediction is basically impossible . More Deutsch than Popper -- DD believed that the growth and unpredictability of knowledge . The creation of knowledge is so unpredictable and radical that long term predictions cannot be made. Often summarised to "prediction is impossible". Of course , Bayesians are all about prediction --but the predictive power of Ates tends only to be demonstrated in you models, where the ontology isn't changing under your feet. Their AI I predictions are explicitly intuition based.

Optimism versus Doom. Deutsch is highly optimistic that continuing knowledge creation will change the world for the better (a kind of moral realism is a component of this). Yudkowsky thinks advanced AI is our last invention and will kill us all.*

https://www.yudkowsky.net/rational/bayes

These are the kind of statements I’m referring to. Happy to be falsified btw :) that’s how we learn.

Also note that Popper never called his theory falsificationism.

Could you recommend an article to learn more about this?

BTW, this isn't a defensive posture on my part: I am not plugged in enough to even have an opinion on any rationalist community, much less identify as one.

[0]: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5087599/

However I'm always surprised how much some people want to talk about intelligence. I mean, it's the common ground of the group in this case, but still.

Whenever I try to get an answer of HOW (as in the attack path), I keep getting a deus ex machina. Reverting to a deus ex machina in a self purported Rationalist movement is inherently irrational. And that's where I feel the crux of the issue is - it's called a "Rationalist" movement, but rationalism (as in the process of synthesizing information using a heuristic) is secondary to the overarching theme of techno-millenarianism.

This is why I feel rationalism is for all intents and purposes a "secular religion" - it's used by people to scratch an itch that religion often was used as well, and the same Judeo-Christian tropes are basically adopted in an obfuscated manner. Unsurprisingly, Eliezer Yudkowsky is an ex-talmid.

There's nothing wrong with that, but hiding behind the guise of being "rational" is dumb when the core belief is inherently irrational.

There's kind of two clusters, one is people who talk about meditation all the time, the other is center-right people who did drugs once. I think the second group showed up because rationalists are not-so-secretly into scientific racism (because they believe anything they see with numbers in it) and they just wanted to hang out with people like that.

There is an interesting atmosphere where it feels like they observed California big tech 1000x engineer types and are trying to cargo cult the way those people behave. I'm not sure what they get out of it.

Some people who fit the description above are Eliezer Yudkowsky and Anna Salamon.

Eliezer started writing a sequence of blog posts that formed the nucleus of the movement in Nov 2006 (a month after the start of Hacker News).

Anna started working full time on AI safety in Mar 2008 and a few years later became the executive director of a non-profit whose mission was to try to help people become more rational. (The main way of its doing so has been in-person workshops IIUC.)

I read the NYT and rat blogs all the time. And the NYT is not the one that's far more likely to deeply engage with the research and studies on the topic.

The level of humility in most subjects is low enough to consume glass. We would all benefit from practicing it more arduously.

I was merely adding support to what I thought was fine advice. And it is.

I agree with this, and I don't think it's at odds with what I said. The point is to never stop sincerely believing you could be wrong. That you are right more often is exactly why it's such an easy trap to fall into. The tools of rationality only help as long as you are actively applying them, which requires a certain amount of humility, even in the face of success.

I'm not affiliated with the rationalist community, but I always interpreted "Less Wrong" as word-play on how "being right" is an absolute binary: you can either be right, or not be right, while "being wrong" can cover a very large gradient.

I expect the community wanted to emphasize how people employing the specific kind of Bayesian iterative reasoning they were proselytizing would arrive at slightly lesser degrees of wrong than the other kinds that "normal" people would use.

If I'm right, your assertion wouldn't be totally inaccurate, but I think it might be missing the actual point.

Obviously, the SEP isn't perfect, but it's a great place to start. There's also the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy [1]; however, I find its articles to be more hit or miss.

[0] https://plato.stanford.edu

[1] https://iep.utm.edu

I say this as someone who had the opposite experience: I had a decent humanities education, but an abysmal mathematics education, and now I am tackling abstract mathematics myself. It's hard. I need to read sections of works multiple times. I need to sit down and try to work out the material for myself on paper.

Any impression that one discipline is easier than another probably just stems from the fact that you had good guides for the one and had the luck to learn it when your brain was really plastic. You can learn the other stuff too, just go in with the understanding that there's no royal road to philosophy just as there's no royal road to mathematics.

It's almost offensive - are technologists so incapable of understanding philosophy that Yudk has to reduce it down to the least common denominator they are all familiar with - some fantasy world we read about as children?

Using a slightly different definition of free will, suddenly Compatibilism becomes obviously incorrect.

And now it's been reduced to quibbling over definitions, thereby reinventing much of the history of philosophy.

This is just the story of the history of philosophy. Going back hundreds of years. See Kant and Hegel for notable examples.

Nobody know what's actually correct, because you have to solve epistemology first, and you have to solve epistemology to solve epistemology...etc.etc.

>And it turns out if you do this, you can discard 90% of philosophy as historical detritus

Nope. For instance , many of the issues Kant raised are still live.

>The massive advantage of the Sequences is they have justified and well-defended confidence

Nope. That would entail answering objections , which EY doesn't stoop to.

>Compatibilism is really obviously correct

Nope. It depends on a semantic issue , what free will means.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Conversation

You can be right or wrong in math. You have can an opinion in English.

Carlyle, Chesterton and Thoreau are about the limit of their philosophical knowledge base.

Still, I'm glad I now know the reference.

Yes, most people don't care how you arrived at an opinion, they rather care about the practical impact of said opinion. IMO this is largely a good thing.

You can logically push yourself to just about any opinion, even absolutely horrific ones. Everyone has implicit biases and everyone is going to start at a different starting point. The problem with string of logic for real-world phenomena is that you HAVE to make assumptions. Like, thousands of them. Because real-world phenomena are complex and your model is simple. Which assumptions you choose to make and in which directions are completely unknown, even to you, the one making said assumptions.

Ultimately most people aren't going to sit here and try to psychoanalyze why you made the assumptions you made and if you were abused in childhood or deduce which country you grew up in or whatever. It's too much work and it's pointless - you yourself don't know, so how would we know?

So, instead, we just look at the end opinion. If it's crazy, people are just going to call you crazy. Which I think is fair.

That post came out a year later, in response to the absurdity of the situation. The very introduction of that post has multiple links showing how much the SMTM post was spreading through the rationalist community with little question.

One of the links is a Eliezer Yudkowsky blog praising the work, which now includes an edited-in disclaimer at the top about how he was mistaken: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/kjmpq33kHg7YpeRYW/briefly-ra...

Pretending that this theory didn't grip the rationalist community all the way to top bloggers like Yudkowsky and Scott Alexander is revisionist history.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Administrators%27_no...

Part of evaluating unusual ideas is that you have to get really good at ignoring bad ones. So when somebody writes a book called "Neoreaction: a Basilisk" and claims that it's about rationality, I make a very simple expected-value calculation.

Curious to read these. Got a source?

I've always been very skeptical of Scott "Alexander" after he and his supporters tricked half of reddit into harassing some journalists for "doxxing" him when his identity was public knowledge seemingly because he just really didn't like the takes presented by the journalists. The way he refers to them like it was a hit piece targeting him reeked of conspiratorial and paranoid thinking.

edit:

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/13/technology/slate-star-cod...

No. Rationalists do say that it's important to do those things, because that's true. But it is not a defense of a "fixation on neoreactionary topics", because there is no such fixation. It only comes across as a fixation to people who are unwilling to even understand what they are denigrating.

You will note that Scott Alexander is heavily critical of neoreaction.

> Yet as soon as the topic turns to criticisms of the rationalist community, we're supposed to ignore those ideas and instead fixate on the messenger, ignore their arguments, and focus on ad-hominem attacks that reduce their credibility.

No. Nobody said that those criticism should be ignored. What was said is that those criticism are invalid, because they are. It is not ad-hominem against Sandifer to point out that Sandifer is trying to insinuate untrue things about Alexander. It is simply observing reality. Sandifer attempts to describe Alexander, Yudkowsky et. al. as supportive of neoreactionary thought. In reality, Alexander, Yudkowsky et. al. are strongly-critical-at-best of neoreactionary thought.

> The leaked e-mails showed he believed there to be "gold" in some of their ideas

This is clutching at straws. Alexander wrote https://slatestarcodex.com/2013/10/20/the-anti-reactionary-f... , in 2013.

You are engaging in the same kind of semantic games that Sandifer does. Please stop.

https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Example-Ancestry-PCA-plo...

We know ethnic groups vary in terms of height, hair color, eye color, melanin, bone density, sprinting ability, lactose tolerance, propensity to diseases like sickle cell anemia, Tay-Sachs, stomach cancer, alcoholism risk, etc. Certain medications need to be dosed differently for different ethnic groups due to the frequency of certain gene variants, e.g. Carbamazepine, Warfarin, Allopurinol.

The fixation index (Fst) quantifies the level of genetic variation between groups, a value of 0 means no differentiation, and 1 is maximal. A 2012 study based on SNPs found that Finns and Swedes have a Fst value of 0.0050-0.0110, Chinese and Europeans at 0.110, and Japanese and Yoruba at 0.190.

https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2675054/

A 1994 study based on 120 alleles found the two most distant groups were Mbuti pygmies and Papua New Guineans at a Fst of 0.4573.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Full_Fst_Average.png

In genome wide association studies, polygenic score have been developed to find thousands of gene variants linked to phenotypes like spatial and verbal intelligence, memory, and processing speed. The distribution of these gene variants is not uniform across ethnic groups.

Given that we know there are genetic differences between groups, and observable variation, it stands to reason that there could be a genetic component for variation in intelligence between groups. It would be dogmatic to a priori claim there is absolutely no genetic component, and pretty obviously motivated out of the fear that inequality is much more intractable than commonly believed.

This is a pathology that has not really been addressed in the large, anywhere, really. Very few in the applied sciences who understand statistical methodology, "leave their areas" -- and many areas that require it, would disappear if it entered.

Well, he was right about that. Pretty much all the details were wrong, but you can't expect that much so it's fine.

The problem is that it's philosophically confused. Many things are "deeply unsafe", the main example being driving or being anywhere near someone driving a car. And yet it turns out to matter a lot less, and matter in different ways, than you'd expect if you just thought about it.

Also see those signs everywhere in California telling you that everything gives you cancer. It's true, but they should be reminding you to wear sunscreen.

A lot of it seems rooted in Asimov-inspired, stimulant-fueled philosophizing than any kind of empirical or grounded observations.

Right, and "actual philosophers" like Sartre and Heidegger _never_ did that. Ever.

"Being and Nothingness" and "Being and Time" are both short enough to fit into a couple tweets, right?

</irony>

It goes like this:

(1) Assert a set of priors (with emphasis on the word assert).

(2) Reason from those priors to some conclusion.

(3) Seamlessly, without skipping a beat, take that solution as valid because the reasoning appears consistent and make that part of a new set of priors.

(4) Repeat, or rather recurse since the new set of priors is built on previous iterations.

The entire concept of science is founded on the idea that you can't do that. You have to stop and touch grass, which in science means making observations or doing experiments if possible. You have to see if the conclusion you reached actually matches reality in any meaningful way. That's because reason alone is fragile. As any programmer knows, a single error or a single mistaken prior propagates and renders the entire tree invalid. Do this recursively and one error anywhere in this crystalline structure means you've built a gigantic tower of bullshit.

I compare it to the Gish gallop because of how enthusiastically they do it, and how by doing it so fast it becomes hard to try to argue against. You end up having to try to counter a firehose of Oh So Very Smart complicated exquisitely reasoned nonsense.

Or you can just, you know, conclude that this entire method of determining truth is invalid and throw the entire thing in the trash.

A good "razor" for this kind of thing is to judge it by its fruit. So far the fruit is AI hysteria, cults like the Zizians, neoreactionary political ideology, Sam Bankman Fried, etc. Has anything good or useful come from any of this?

> squirming, slithering things that should not be given access to the light.

;)

Those are only named cults though; they just love self-organizing into such patterns. Of course, living in group homes is a "rational" response to Bay Area rents.

> the fertile soil which is perfect for growing cults

This is true but it's not rationalism, it's just that they're from Berkeley. As far as I can tell if you live in Berkeley you just end up joining a cult.

Cult member: It's not a cult! It's an organization that promotes love and..

Hank Hill: This is it.

Edit: Oh, but you call him "Guru" ... so on reflection you were probably (?) making the same point... (whoosh, sorry).

I'd like to thank my useless brain for deciding to write that one down.

*Guess I’m a rationalist now.

For what it’s worth, you seem to be agreeing with the person you replied to. Their main point is that this break down happens primarily because people identify as Rationalists (or whatever else). Taken from that angle, Rationalism as an identity does not appear to be useful.